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Each year some 6,700 Americans die while awaiting an organ
transplant.' On its face, this fact seems almost inconsequential,
representing less than 3% of American deaths annually.2 However,
for the nearly 100,000 patients on the transplant wait list3 (and their
families), nothing could be more consequential.4 What is more, the
demand for transplantable organs is sure to rise as (1) more diseases
become subject to prevention or cure, making organ failure the first
sign of medical problems; 5 (2) the success rate for transplants
increases, leading to wider use;6 and (3) barriers to inclusion on the
wait list are removed.7
* Assistant Professor at the University of Georgia School of Law; of counsel with Ivins,
Phillips & Barker, Chartered; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; M.A., New York
University; B.A., New College of Florida. Thanks to Dan Coenen, Erica Hashimoto, James
P.A. Ryan, Jason Howard and Alice Snedeker for their invaluable editing assistance, and to
James Donovan for his research assistance.
1. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network ("OPTN"), Data, http://www.optn.
org/Data (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (6,670 patients died while waiting for an organ in 2007,
and 6,867 died while waiting in 2006).
2. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Fast Stats A to Z: Deaths/Mortality, http://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/FASTATS/deaths.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (reporting that 2,448,017 U.S.
citizens died in 2005).
3. See OPTN, supra note 1 (reporting 100,113 patients on the wait list as of October 12,
2008).
4. See, e.g., Andrew C. MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus
the Ethical Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 177, 177 (1997) (describing his brother's
suffering and death from kidney failure while still waiting for a transplantable kidney).
5. See Sally L. Satel & Benjamin E. Hippin, When Altruism Is Not Enough: The
Worsening Organ Shortage and What It Means For the Elderly, 15 ELDER L.J. 153, 162
(2007) (discussing how improved medical treatment caused increased kidney failure).
6. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a
Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (commenting on improved life-sustaining
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Only about one-half of decedents who are medically eligible
have their organs harvested for transplant because of the failure of the
others to provide consent to the transfer.8 While most Americans
claim to support organ donation, only approximately twenty-seven
percent express a willingness to donate their organs upon death.9 In
addition, while living organ donations are possible in some instances,
only one-sixth of American organ transplants annually come from
living donors.10 Thus, there is a net gain of approximately 4,500 new
registrations1" to the organ transplant wait list each year.1 2  At least
among academics, there is a consensus that the current U.S.
approach-relying on altruism alone to provide the organs needed by
the persons on the wait lists-is insufficient. 13  As a result,
medical technology and increased number of transplanted organs); Gina Kolata, Newest
Treatments Create a Quandary On Medicare Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E7D81230F934A2575BCOA9659C8
B63.
7. See, e.g., MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
BODY PARTS 85-106 (2006) (describing the process by which individuals are added to the
organ wait list and arguing that many otherwise eligible recipients, primarily African
Americans, either are not diagnosed in time to become candidates or simply are never referred
for organ transplantation).
8. See Kelly A. Carroll, Does How We Ask for Organs Determine Whether People
Decide to Donate?, 7 AM. MED. ASS'N J. OF ETHICS, Sept. 2005, available at
http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2005/09/pdf/j dsc 1-0509.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 6, at 9 (citing a 1985 Gallup poll for the proposition that
"only twenty-seven percent [of Americans] were willing to donate their own organs in the
event of their death, and only seventeen percent claimed to have signed organ donor cards.");
Kelly A. Carroll, Does How We Ask for Organs Determine Whether People Decide to
Donate?, 7 AM. MED. ASS'N J. OF ETHICS, Sept. 2005, available at http://virtualmentor.ama-
assn.org/2005/09/pdf/jdsc I -0509.pdf. Of these potential donors, only two percent die annually
under circumstances that allow their organs to be transplanted. HMS Researchers Address
Transplant Organ Shortage, HARV. GAZETTE, Oct. 2, 2003, available at
http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/10.02/21 
-organs.html (stating that only two percent
of registered donors "annually suffer brain death and meet the other medical requirements for
being a cadaveric donor").
10. See OPTN, supra note I (showing 4,910 living donor organ donations in 2007 and
5,063 in 2006).
11. Registrations count the total number of organs needed by patients on the wait list.
Many patients need more than one organ resulting in multiple registrations for the same
patient. See OPTN, supra note 1.
12. Id. In 2007, there was a net gain of 4,524 registrations to the wait list: 52,867 new
registrations were added while 48,343 registrations were removed for various other reasons,
including for successful transplants (28,358) or death (7,231). In 2006, the net gain was 4,448:
53,001 new registrations with 48,553 removals, including 28,935 transplants and 7,508 deaths.
13. See Charles C. Dunham IV, "Body Property": Challenging the Ethical Barriers in
Organ Transplantation to Protect IndividualAutonomy, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 40 (2008).
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commentators have called for a rethinking of current organ
procurement practices to increase the supply of organs available for
transplantation. 14
Of the solutions currently proposed, financial incentives for
organ transfers are the most provocative, drawing both the most
ardent support and the harshest criticisms.15 Under current law, such
incentives are prohibited. 6  Still, tax incentives encouraging the
consensual harvesting of organs upon death or of organs not needed
to sustain a donor's life prove alluring to both legislators and
academics, who argue that such incentives would address many of the
problems with direct payments.' 7  These analysts argue that tax
incentives would (1) be consistent with the tax treatment of donations
to charity;' 8 (2) prevent coercion by remunerating low income
taxpayers less than higher income ones;' 9 and/or (3) be less crassly
commercial than direct payments.20  Each of these arguments has
been largely unexamined in the scholarly literature.
In this article, I leave to one side the much-debated question
about whether it is ethical to permit individuals to sell and buy
organs. Instead, I examine the arguments for creating tax incentives
for organ donations in light of the goals, principles and practices of
our tax system and conclude that currently tax incentives are an
inefficient and inappropriate means to encourage increased donations
of organs.
First, I argue that allowing such incentives would be directly
contrary to our current tax treatment of donations in that it would
allow an item never included in the tax base to offset income included
in it. Second, using the progressive nature of our tax system to reduce
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. Financial incentives proposed range from allowing individuals to purchase organs
directly from each other to a mediated system in which the government or an insurer acts as
the buyer, then transfers the purchased organs to patients on the organ transfer wait list. Other
proposed approaches include retaining the altruistic system but changing the rules, see infra
notes 30-36 and accompanying text, and the provision of non-financial benefits, see infra
notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
16. See National Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA"), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2008) (no
compensation is allowed for providing an organ that is not a "human organ paired donation" if
such provision "affects interstate commerce") and discussion infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.A.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. See infra Part 1V.C.
2008]
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the value of any such incentives to low income taxpayers (or to deny
individuals whose income falls below a certain level the incentive at
all) is paternalism and cannot be justified by a reduction in the
possible coercive effect of such incentives. Third, I contend that
opaque means-tax incentives rather than direct payments-should
not be employed where the end is as hotly contested as is the
commodification of our bodies.
In Part II of this article, I provide a brief overview of the current
system of organ procurement in the United States, the systemic
changes proposed to increase permissible harvesting of organs, and
proposed financial and non-financial incentives for organ donation.
Part III focuses on the broad goals and principles of our tax system
and how tax incentives work. Part IV reviews the primary rationales
for using tax incentives to encourage organ donations and argues that
they undermine the goals and principles of the tax system. In
addition, it raises additional questions in an effort to help guide future
debate and policy-making in this field.
II. U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT: NOW AND MAYBE
A. The Current System
The National Organ Transfer Act ("NOTA") governs the transfer
of human organs.21 Passed in 1984 in response to efforts by a
Virginia company to begin trading in organs, NOTA prohibits the
transfer of organs in exchange for valuable consideration. 22 Thus,
under current law, a gratuitous transfer from a donor is the only
permissible form of transfer for an organ. While seventy-five percent
of Americans claim to support organ donation, 23 only twenty-seven to
twenty-eight percent do consent to allow harvesting of their organs on
death,24 yielding approximately 23,000 deceased donor organs
transplanted annually.2
5
Currently, the primary method for obtaining organs for
transplant in the United States is by active consent. The default rule
21. 42 U.S.C. § 274e.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a).
23. See Cohen, supra note 6.
24. Id.
25. See OPTN, supra note I (there were 23,448 deceased donor transplants in 2007 and
23,872 in 2006).
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is no transfer; thus, only if an individual specifies that it is permissible
for his organs to be harvested 26 or if a decedent's next of kin provides
such permission can the donor's organs be removed.27 Apart from the
dearth of individuals consenting to donate organs, many hospitals fail
to follow expressed donor preferences unless the decedent's family
also consents, even in the thirty-two states with laws that explicitly
give the decedent's consent standing alone dispositive effect.
28
Moreover, even where consent is not at issue, hospitals often do not
receive the information they need in time to utilize the organs.29
Thus, under the current system, there is confusion about what consent
is adequate for donation and how to implement that consent.
B. Proposed Changes
In an effort to encourage organ donation, many commentators
have suggested changes to the current U.S. procurement system. The
most common suggestions involve changing from a consent-based
system to a presumed consent (or "opt-out"), 30 mandated choice, 3 1 or
26. In all states except Massachusetts, Mississippi and New York, all that is legally
required is a written document of gift, such as a specification on a driver's license. SAM
CROWE & ERIC COHEN, PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, ORGAN DONATION POLICY
(2006), http://www.bioethics.gov/background/crowepaper.html#edn 6 (staff discussion paper).
27. The exceptions to this rule are very limited. See infra note 30 (discussing when it is
permissible for organs to be transferred without explicit consent).
28. See Jim Ritter, Not Nearly Enough To Go Around: The Future of Organ
Transplantation, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 5, 2004, at 19. See also CROWE & COHEN, supra note
26 (opining that procurement teams should defer to a family's decision to not donate organs
despite a donor's contrary intent). For a critique of this override option, see Leonard H.
Bucklin, Woe Unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal Considerations in
Rejecting a Deceased's Anatomical Gift Because There is No Consent by the Survivors, 78
N.D. L. REv. 323, 344-46 (2002) (focusing specifically on legal actions of negligence, tortious
interference with a contract, and violation of civil rights upon such override).
29. See Carolina A. Nadel & Mark S. Nadel, Using Reciprocity to Motivate Organ
Donations, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 293, 297 (2005) (discussing why hospitals
do not follow donor preferences); CROWE & COHEN, supra note 26 (stating family of donor
plays a central role in determining the organs donated).
30. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & David Sanders, Organ Transplantation: A
Proposal for Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 NEW ENG. J. MED. 413 (1968)
(arguing from an ethical and historical perspective that the presumption against harvesting
cadaveric organs should be reversed); Linda C. Fentiman, Organ Donation As National
Service: A Proposed Federal Organ Donation Law, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1593, 1598 (1993)
(proposing presumed consent as alternative to organ procurement and allocation). See also
CROWE & COHEN, supra note 26 (discussing limited form of presumed consent currently
employed in the United States).
20081
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conscription 32 regime. In addition, broadening the medical criteria for
potential donors has been suggested in some cases.33 Finally, some
analysts advocate the reduction or removal of disincentives to
donation through legislation allowing paid leave for donations, 34 tax
deductions or credits to cover unreimbursed costs of donation, 35 and
outright grants to cover such costs. 36
Beyond these systemic changes, some commentators have
proposed affirmative incentives for donation. The less controversial
31. See, e.g., Denise Spellman, Encouragement Is Not Enough: The Benefits of
Instituting a Mandated Choice Organ Procurement System, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 353, 370(2006) (describing prospective system requiring donors to make affirmative choice); Andrew
C. MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus the Ethical Spotlight, 8
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 177, 183 (1997) (proposing requiring that individuals record choice in
a central database available to all hospitals).
32. See, e.g., Theodore Silver, The Case For a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a
Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681, 681 (1988) (allowing only an
exemption for religious objections).
33. See, e.g., H.B. 3857, 93d Gen. Assem. H.R. (Il1. 2004) (authorizing organ donations
from HIV-positive individuals to other HIV-positive individuals); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
2310/2310-330 (LexisNexis 2008); United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"), Expanded
Criteria Donor Kidneys Brochure, http://www.unos.org/SharedContentDocuments/Expanded
CriteriaDonorKidneysBrochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (created "ECD" category for
higher-risk organ donors, including those from deceased donors over 60 years of age and from
those over age 50 with certain medical conditions).
34. For example, Colorado offers state employees two days paid leave for donation;
Delaware, Washington, D.C., Maryland, Missouri, Utah, and Virginia provide thirty days of
paid leave; and Ohio provides six weeks of paid leave. Arkansas requires that private
employees be allowed an unpaid leave of absence for donation. The federal government
mandates that any executive branch employee be allowed to take seven days of paid leave for
bone marrow donation and thirty days of paid leave to serve as an organ donor, with only one
paid leave period in each calendar year. CROWE & COHEN, supra note 26. See also Jason
Feifer, Paying Big to Be a Donor, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2007, at HE1 (stating federal
government employees receive thirty days of paid leave if they donate an organ).
35. At least eleven states offer such tax incentives. CROWE & COHEN, supra note 26.
On the federal level, the Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act was signed into law
April 5, 2004, and provides for reimbursement of travel and subsistence expenses and
incidental non-medical expenses incurred in living organ donation. 42 U.S.C. § 274f (2008).
A later proposed Act, "The Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act of 2005," was presented in the
House on May 19, 2005 (it ultimately failed), and it attempted to provide a credit to living
individuals who donated organs up to $5,000 to cover unreimbursed costs and lost wages due
to organ donation. H.R. 2474, 109th Cong. (2005).
36. Iowa has a donor awareness fund, fifty percent of which may be used to cover the
otherwise unreimbursed costs of living donors, recipients and transplant candidates. CROWE &
COHEN, supra note 26.
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of these involve providing non-financial benefits 37 to transferors
through organ exchanges, 38 reciprocal benefit arrangements, 39 and
mutual insurance pooling.40  On a smaller scale, Ohio, Kentucky,
Maine and New York each have passed laws providing for public
recognition of donors,4' and some commentators have proposed
medals of honor and reimbursement for the funeral expenses of
donors, as well as medical leave and special donor insurance for
living donors.42
While many commentators favor reliance on such non-financial
incentives, others have argued in favor of financial incentives,
through the development of open markets such as those that exist
today for "donations" of plasma, sperm, and eggs in which either
individuals, the government or insurance companies would be the
buyers43  Others have argued specifically for the creation of a
37. But see Vanessa Chandis, Addressing a Dire Situation: A Multi-Faceted Approach to
the Kidney Shortage, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 205, 248-49 (2006) (summarizing the
arguments against such proposals).
38. In this approach, two transplant candidates who are not a match for the organs of
potential donors "swap" donors so that each receives an organ from the other's friend or
family or other intended donor. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Increasing the Supply of Organs
for Transplantation Through Paired Organ Exchanges, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 221, 223-
24 (2003) (describing process of organ exchanges). Alternatively, a candidate with an
incompatible donor has such donor contribute his organ to the general pool, and the candidate
receives the next compatible organ from the general pool. Sarah Elizabeth Statz, Finding the
Winning Combination: How Blending Organ Procurement Systems Used Internationally Can
Reduce the Organ Shortage, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1677, 1703-04 (2006).
39. In this alternative, individuals pledging to donate their organs upon death would
receive priority on wait lists for organs should they need them. See, e.g., Nadel & Nadel,
supra note 29, at 312-17 (detailing authors' reciprocity proposal).
40. In mutual insurance pooling, individuals would elect to join a pool of individuals,
each pledging to donate his organs to the pool on death, in return for the ability to receive an
organ as needed from the pool of organs already contributed by the other members. Richard
Schwindt & Aidan Vining, Proposal for a Mutual Insurance Pool for Transplant Organs, 23 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 725, 727 (1998).
41. Ohio partially funds local and statewide programs that publicly recognize families of
deceased donors, and "Kentucky, Maine and New York ... dedicate a day or week to publicly
recognize organ donors." CROWE & COHEN, supra note 26.
42. See Francis L. Delmonico, et al., Ethical Incentives-Not Payment-for Organ
Donation, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2002, 2003-04 (2002) (advocating congressional legislation
to encourage organ donation).
43. See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 Va. L. Rev. 163,
174-75 (2000) (arguing that such markets already exist, but that under current law only the
companies that receive and process human tissue may profit, not the people whose bodies the
tissue comprised); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies,
and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1813, 1816-17 (2007) (arguing for the
development of markets on "self-defense" grounds).
2008]
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"futures" market, in which individuals could contract for organ
removal upon death.44 Some states have tried a variety of more
modest incentives for donation.45 However, critics are concerned that
a market-based approach to organ transfer is a bad idea. Their
concerns focus on fears that a regime of free market trading will
unfairly favor rich over poor organ seekers, coerce socially
disadvantaged individuals into selling their organs, decrease altruism,
cause people to view their bodies as fungible commodities, encourage
antisocial behavior (for example, murder and suicide), and encourage
violations of medical ethics.
46
III. TAx POLICY AND INCENTIVES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Because financial incentives in the form of direct payments for
organs strike many Americans as unseemly,47 commentators and
legislators have proposed providing tax incentives instead.48 Such
incentives may take the form of deductions or credits against income
or estate tax liability, and affect taxpayers in disparate ways.49
A. Goals and Principles of the U.S. Tax System
The U.S. tax system has three primary goals: raising revenue,
redistributing wealth, and (perhaps most controversially) regulating
44. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 6, at 30 (arguing that such system would avoid
exploitation of the poor as it would be limited to cadaveric organs, and it would not benefit the
wealthy as organ allocation would be done without regard to payment).
45. For example, Georgia has provided a seven dollar discount on driver's license fees in
exchange for registration as an organ donor. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-25(d)(2) (2003)
(amended 2005).
46. See, e.g., Gloria J. Banks, Legal and Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's
Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM.
J.L. & MED. 45, 99-100 (1995) (noting concerns with legalized market in human organs);
Richard Epstein, Kidney Beancounters, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2006, at A15; Chandis, supra
note 37, at 229 (advocating proposal that eliminates exploitation of the poor); Jennifer L.
Hurley, Cashing In on the Transplant List: An Argument Against Offering Valuable
Compensation for the Donation of Organs, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 117, 132 (2004) (noting
existence of "clear evidence demonstrating economic incentives for donating parts of the
human body will lead to exploitation of underprivileged groups").
47. See, e.g., CROWE & COHEN, supra note 26.
48. See H.R. 2090, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing up to a $2,500 credit for organ
donation); H.R. 1872, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing up to $10,000 tax credit for deceased-
donor organ donations); Frederick R. Parker, Jr. et al., Organ Procurement and Tax Policy, 2
Hous. J. HEALTH L. POL'Y 173, 175-176 (2002).
49. See Chandis, supra note 37, at 266-67.
[45:67
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private economic activity.50  In evaluating whether a particular tax
provision advances these goals, analysts often focus on the principles
of horizontal equity,51  efficiency,
5 2  individual equity,53
administrability54 and transparency.55
While raising revenue through a tax system is fairly
noncontroversial and the primary debate over redistribution currently
is the degree that should be achieved,56 the increasing regulation of
private economic activity through the tax code is the subject of much
debate. Opponents see such regulation as making the tax system less
effective by undermining redistributive goals and making the tax code
less administrable.51  Policymakers, however, have increasingly
favored this approach to encourage desired behavior 58 or discourage
unwanted behavior.59
The incentives provided by the federal tax code for desired
behavior are enormous. The Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC"), for
50. See, e.g., C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 10-15 (Jeffrey
Butts et al. eds., 2004) (describing goals of tax system); LILY L. BATCHELDER ET AL.,
BROOKINGS INST., REFORMING TAX INCENTIVES INTO UNIFORM REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS
(2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/200 6 /O8taxes-orszag/
pb156.pdf (summarizing such goals); Parker et al., supra note 48, at 173 (noting tax law as
instrument of social policy).
51. Horizontal equity refers to whether similarly situation taxpayers are treated equally.
STEUERLE, supra note 50, at 10.
52. See STEUERLE, supra note 50, at 12-13. Efficiency is achieved if transaction costs
are minimized and externalities, market power and information asymmetries are corrected.
Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits,
59 STAN. L. REV. 23,42 (2006).
53. Individual equity refers to whether a particular individual is treated fairly.
STEUERLE, supra note 50, at 13.
54. Administrability refers to the simplicity of the provision and involves minimization
of compliance costs to the taxpayer and of monitoring costs to the government. See id. at 14;
Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives, supra note 52, at 42 (emphasizing that tax
system should minimize administrative compliance costs).
55. A policy is considered transparent if it its purpose is presented in an open manner.
STEUERLE, supra note 50, at 15.
56. See Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives, supra note 52, at 42 (noting
"great debate" over "degree of progressivity" that should be accomplished).
57. See discussion infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text for the effect of deductions
(and, to a lesser extent, credits) under a progressive tax system.
58. BATCHELDER ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., supra note 5050.
59. See, e.g., Joseph J. Cordes et al., Raising Revenue by Taxing Activities with Social
Costs, 43 NAT'L. Tax J. 343, 343-56 (1990) (citing taxes on cigarettes, alcohol and polluting
activities as examples of corrective taxes).
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example, operates as the largest welfare program in the country. 60
The value of the tax break for employer-provided health insurance is
growing more quickly than that of almost any other domestic
program.6' In addition, there are tax subsidies for alternative energy
use and production, saving for retirement, home ownership, education
and medical expenses, and the promotion of work, charitable giving
and certain investments. 62 The incentives offered by these programs
reduce federal revenues by approximately $500 billion per year63 and
account for approximately one-quarter to one-third of the federal
subsidies and benefits provided to Americans. 64
B. Deductions, Credits, and Refundable Credits: How They Fit In
A tax incentive can be provided through use of either a
deduction or a credit; which is employed and how it is implemented
affects to whom it is available and its value. 65
A deduction reduces taxable income so that its value depends
upon an individual's marginal tax rate.66 For this reason, an income
tax deduction is worth more to a higher income taxpayer than to a low
income taxpayer. For example, a deduction of $12,000 yields a
$3,000 tax savings for an individual whose marginal tax rate is
twenty-five percent, but only $1,200 to an individual in the ten
percent tax bracket. 67 In an early effort to spur organ donations, the
U.S. House of Representatives in 1981 considered a bill that would
have provided a $25,000 tax deduction for certain deceased donor
60. STEUERLE, supra note 50, at 1-2.
61. See id. at2.
62. See Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives, supra note 52, at 43.
63. See id.; BATCHELDER ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., supra note 50.
64. STEUERLE, supra note 50, at 2.
65. I am setting aside proposals (and enactments of proposals) in favor of deductions or
credits as a means to reimburse individuals for expenses associated with donation; these have
been briefly discussed in Part II, supra. Incentives to compensate payment of lost wages are in
a different category than reimbursement of these other expenses as they involve payment for
labor not done, and so should be considered under the principles set forth in Parts III and IV of
this article.
66. See, e.g., Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549, 557 (2008).
67. Id. at 556. See also FRANK SAMMARTINO & ERIC TODER, URBAN INST., SOCIAL
POLICY AND THE TAX SYSTEM (2002), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310418-
TaxSystem.pdf (explaining differential value of deductions to low income and middle income
taxpayers).
[45:67
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organ transfers. 68  This proposal was rejected but has continued to
receive scholarly support.
69
A deduction can be either "above the line" or "below the line."7
"Above the line" deductions, like deductions for retirement savings,
are available to all taxpayers, regardless of whether they claim the
standard deduction or itemize their deductions on their tax returns.
7
'
"Below the line" deductions, like those for charitable donations, are
available only to taxpayers who itemize deductions 72 and are often
subject to "phase-outs ' '73 at certain income levels.74 Proposals for tax
incentives for organ donations generally focus on "below the line"
deductions.
A credit, on the other hand, offsets actual taxes due, providing a
one-to-one return to a taxpayer up to the total tax due.75 Thus, a
credit of $12,000 is ostensibly worth $12,000 to a taxpayer regardless
of his marginal tax rate or whether he itemizes or claims the standard
deduction. However, to the extent a taxpayer's tax liability would
otherwise be less than this $12,000, the value of most credits is
reduced accordingly: a taxpayer who owes only $8,000 in federal
taxes would only be able to use $8,000 of the posited $12,000
credit.76 Bills have been introduced in Congress to offer this sort of
income tax credit for donated organs but have thus far been
unsuccessful; commentators have taken up the cause as well.77
68. H.R. 3774, 97th Cong. (1981). See also Tax Incentives: A Market Solution to the
Kidney Shortage?, 11 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Oct. 1981, at 3.
69. See, e.g., Frederick R. Parker, Jr. & William J. Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood
Supply, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 89, 90-92 (2003) (proposing amendment to Internal
Revenue Code to allow such a deduction).
70. DANIEL Q. PoSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH DIAGRAMS
FOR EASY UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 363 (5th ed. 2000).
71. Id. at 503-04.
72. Thus, they are generally not available to lower income taxpayers or taxpayers who
are subject to the alternative minimum tax. Id.
73. See I.R.C. § 1 (2004).
74. See POSIN, supra note 70, at 363, 467.
75. Seeid.at581.
76. Refundable tax credits, which return amounts above a taxpayer's tax liability to him,
are discussed infra in notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., H.R. 2090, 107th Cong. (2001), supra note 48; H.R. 1872, 107th Cong.
(2001), supra note 48; Joseph B. Clamon, Tax Policy as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and
Organ Donation Through Tax Credits, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 67, 97-99 (2008) (proposing
credits in predetermined amounts for donations of body tissue, excluding donations of sperm,
eggs, or hair).
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Since income tax deductions and credits benefit middle income
taxpayers more highly than lower income taxpayers, such incentives
will encourage behavior (here, donating organs) more strongly in
middle income taxpayers than in low income ones.78 Estate tax
deductions or credits, as have sometimes been proposed,79 would do
so to a much greater extent. These incentives would benefit only
wealthy donors, as taxpayers dying with a taxable estate under $2
million are not subject to this tax,80 so low or middle income
taxpayers would not be eligible. 81
It is possible to structure credits so that they are worth the same
amount to all taxpayers by making them "refundable". Like standard
credits, refundable tax credits act first to offset any tax liability. In
contrast to standard tax credits, however, refundable tax credits can
result in affirmative payments to a taxpayer. For example, a taxpayer
eligible for a $12,000 refundable credit who has only $8,000 of pre-
credit tax liability would pay no taxes and would receive a $4,000
check from the U.S. Treasury Department. Thus, unlike a regular
credit, a refundable tax credit allows a low income taxpayer to walk
away with cash above any tax liability, instead of leaving behind the
amount otherwise payable after the offset of tax liability. 82 However,
refundable tax credits only apply to taxpayers.8 3 An individual who
does not have positive income for a year and therefore does not file a
tax return cannot claim the credit.
The main refundable tax credits in existence today are the EITC,
the child care credit, and a small health insurance credit.8 4  While
small in number, refundable tax credits are large in impact: the
growth of tax credits has increased dramatically since 1986.85 In
general, refundable tax credits are used today only when the
78. Jenn, supra note 66, at 557.
79. See Chandis, supra note 37 (advocating an estate tax credit).
80. The $2 million exclusion applies for 2008; in 2009 the exclusion rises to $3.5
million. I.R.C. § 2010 (2007). Under current law, there will be no estate tax due from
individuals dying in 2010, and thus (assuming no changes in the law) an estate tax credit
would not provide incentive to any taxpayers that year. See id.
81. Or even many high income taxpayers, since the estate tax is assessed against wealth,
not income.
82. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives, supra note 52.
83. POSIN, supra note 70, at 581.
84. I.R.C. §§ 32, 35, 45F (2007).
85. See STEUERLE, supra note 50 (describing tremendous growth in the value of
refundable tax credits).
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"government wishes to allocate money to achieve a fundamental
societal objective. 86 For some, this includes increasing the supply of
transplantable organs.
87
IV. WHY NOT USE TAX INCENTIVES?
Providing tax incentives for organ donation is more ethically
palatable to some academics and legislators than outright payments
and is perceived to reinforce the current altruistic focus of organ
procurement policy. 88  As a result, even commentators who do not
argue that tax incentives are the best way to increase the supply of
transplantable organs have flagged this option,89  and ethics
committees of the United Network for Organ Sharing, the American
Society of Transplant Surgeons, the World Transplant Congress, and
the President's Council on Bioethics have considered the merits of
initiatives that would provide tax breaks in exchange for organ
donations. 90  In my view, however, the suggested strengths that
advocates ascribe to such a system are illusory and in conflict with
our tax system.
A. (Dis)Juncture Between Income, Tax Incentives, and Organ
Transfers
Some proponents of tax incentives for organ donations argue that
such a system would simply bring the tax treatment of organ
donations in line with that of other donations and encourage altruistic
actions more generally. The current organ procurement system relies
86. Clamon, supra note 77, at 67, 95. In contrast, Batchelder et al. argue from an
efficiency perspective that, instead, refundable credits should be the default choice for all tax
incentives so as to provide the same incentive to engage in the desired behavior in all
taxpayers. They propose that deductions or nonrefundable credits be used only where
"policymakers have specific knowledge that such households are more responsive to the
incentive or that their engaging in the behavior generates larger social benefits." Batchelder et
al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives, supra note 52.
87. See, e.g., Parker et al., supra note 48 (arguing that increasing the supply of
transplantable organs is a priority of American health policy and thus is an appropriate object
of tax legislation and proposing a refundable tax credit for binding organ donation pledges).
88. See, e.g., Clamon, supra note 77 (summarizing perceived virtues of tax incentives as
means for increasing donations).
89. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash For Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives To End
America's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 69, 111-13 (2004) (examining positive
effects of tax incentives for organ donation).
90. See Sally Satel, Op-Ed, Death's Waiting List, N. Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006, at A21.
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solely on altruism in that individuals who allow their organs to be
transplanted can receive no compensation. Because altruism is
generally accepted to be a societal good, as it is believed to increase
social cohesion and our sense of community, many believe it should
be encouraged.9' One way we encourage altruism is to provide tax
incentives to individuals who make contributions to qualified
charitable organizations.
Currently, no deduction is available for organ donations. The
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") asserts that transferring most
human body parts and products is a service, and thus non-
deductible.92 In addition, even if such transfers were considered
transfers of property rather than the provision of a service, these items
would most likely be considered ordinary income property. 93  Any
deduction for ordinary income property is limited to the lesser of the
donor's basis94 and fair market value; in most cases, this would be
would be $0. 95  In instances where the deductible amount was
established to be greater than $0, the recipient would still need to be a
qualified charitable organization. 96 As currently organ donations are
made to for-profit companies or to individuals, no deduction would be
available even if donation of human body parts was defined as a
property transfer (rather than a provision of services) and a value was
assigned to the donation. While all of this could easily be changed
simply by amending the tax code and/or putting in place charitable
organizations like the American Red Cross to act as intermediaries in
organ transfers, affording a charitable deduction for organ transfers is
currently not in accord with tax policy and practice.
91. See, e.g., Julia Mahoney, The Market For Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REv. 163, 215-
17 (2000) (summarizing the altruism argument for rejecting markets for organs).
92. Only certain transfers of property are eligible for the charitable donation deduction;
transfers of services are not. See Rev. Rul. 162, 1953-2 C.B. 127-28 (deciding that the value
of blood donated to a blood bank was not deductible as it was donation of service); sales of
ova are also taxed as personal services. But see I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,418 (Sept. 15,
1975) (stating that sales of mother's milk are properly taxed as sales of property).
93. Examples of ordinary income property include items held in inventory, works of art
donated by the artist, and capital assets held 1 year or less.
94. Basis is generally equal to an item's acquisition cost. See I.R.C. § 1012 (2007).
95. For tissue that qualifying as "long-term capital gain property", the deduction would
be equal to the fair market value of the property. However, absent a market on which to value
the body part or product, such value would again be $0.
96. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2007).
[45:67
HeinOnline  -- 45 Willamette L. Rev. 80 2008-2009
TAX INCENTIVES AND ORGAN TRANSFERS
In the context of blood donations, Professors Frederick R.
Parker, Jr. and William Winslade argue that the current tax law
communicates the view that donating is not a top priority, since
deductions are afforded for the donation of other items but not for
products.97 They argue for a new approach to signal the value society
places on those who donate these items, thereby stimulating donation
"by placing blood donors on the same footing as those who donate
other forms of property." 98  Charles Paine joined with Professors
Parker and Winslade more recently to extend this argument to organ
donation, emphasizing that we broadly choose to encourage gift-
making in other realms through tax benefits to indicate the value we,
as a society, place on certain altruistic acts. 99 They believe we should
extend this treatment to the donation of body tissue.
100
On closer examination, though, the analogy between organ
donations and charitable donations proves inapt. Property transferred
to a charitable organization for which a deduction is allowed has an
underlying economic component-income tax already paid or
otherwise due with respect to the item is offset by the deduction,
leaving the donor in much the same tax position as if the income had
never been earned. However, until the time when organ transfers for
payment are allowed, a transfer of one's organs is a non-economic
event to the donor. Thus, allowing a tax benefit for organ donation
permits a non-economic event to offset income, thereby causing a
mismatch.
The key point can be illustrated by comparing the tax effect of a
deduction for a contribution to a qualified charitable organization and
a hypothetical deduction for donation of an organ. 01 For example,
97. See Parker & Winslade, supra note 69, at 89, 89-90, 91 (describing tax benefits for
charitable contributions other than bodily donations, and advocating tax incentives specifically
in the context of donations of blood).
98. Parker & Winslade, supra note 69, at 89, 91. See M. Lane Molen, Note and
Comment, Recognizing the Larger Sacrifice: Easing the Burdens Borne by Living Organ
Donors Through Federal Tax Deductions, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 459, 462 (2007) (analogizing
charitable deduction allowance for donations of body tissue to the transfer of property, such as
a car, to charity).
99. Parker et al., supra note 48, at 174-175.
100. See id. (endorsing tax incentives as a form of economic motivation to donate
organs).
101. For purposes of this article, I am setting aside discussion of taxes other than federal
income tax (and, in some cases, federal estate tax), and assuming that the hypothetical
taxpayer itemizes deductions on his tax return, is not subject to reductions in the deductions he
can claim because of his income level, and is not subject to the alternative minimum tax.
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consider three single taxpayers, one with $60,000 in taxable income
for 2008, another with $72,000, and the third with $72,000 prior to
contributing $12,000 (in cash or property) to charities. Taxpayer l's
tax liability is $11,344; Taxpayer 2's is $14,344.102 While Taxpayer 3
tentatively owes the same tax as Taxpayer 2 as each starts with
$72,000 in taxable income, once Taxpayer 3 contributes $12,000 to
qualified charitable organizations, his taxable income is reduced by an
equal amount, leaving him with taxable income of $60,000 and a tax
liability of $11,344, as though he had never earned the contributed
amounts at all.
Taxpayer 1 Taxpayer 2 Taxpayer 3
Starting Taxable Income $60,000 $72,000 $72,000
Amount to Charity $0 $0 $12,000
Taxable Income $60,000 $72,000 $60,000
Tax Due $11,344 $14,344 $11,344
Amount to Taxpayer $48,656 $57,656 $48,656
Taxpayer 3's gifts to the charities, then, are comprised of $9,000
from the taxpayer and the $3,000 that he otherwise would have paid
in tax, an amount which is effectively transferred from the federal
government to the charities. 10 3 The deduction acts simply to offset
the federal income tax ($3,000) otherwise due on the funds
transferred to charity.'
0 4
However, we do not allow a deduction for contributions of
services to charitable organizations because the value of the service is
102. The tax is calculated as follows: income up to $8,025 is taxed at 10%, between
$8,025 and $32,550 at 15%, and between $32,550 and $78,850 at 25%. Thus, for each
taxpayer in the example, the first $8,025 of income produces a tax of $802.50, the next
$24,525 produces a tax of $3,678.75, and income above $32,550 is taxed at 25%, for totals of
$11,343.75 for Taxpayer 1 ($802.50+$3,678.75+$6,862.50) and $14,343.75 for Taxpayer 2
($802.50+$3,678.75+$9,862.50). Tax owed is rounded to the nearest whole dollar.
103. This is shown in the $9,000 difference between what Taxpayer 2 ($57,656) and
Taxpayer 3 ($48,656) take home, and the $3,000 difference in their tax due (between $14,344
and $11,344), with the extra $12,000 transferred to charity in the case of Taxpayer 3.
104. Similarly, deductions for donations of property act to offset income tax paid on
income used to acquire the property in the first instance and, in some instances, tax that would
have been due if the property had been disposed of at market rather than by contribution.
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never taken into income in the first place. For example, a lawyer with
taxable income of $60,000 who then performs free legal services for
which she would normally bill $12,000 is not allowed to then deduct
$12,000 from her taxable income. Instead, because she did not charge
the charity the $12,000, that amount is simply excluded from her
income so that $0 is taken into income, $0 is allowed as a deduction,
$0 is owed in taxes on the services, and $12,000 in value is
transferred to the charity.
Starting Taxable Income $60,000
Services performed for charity:
retail value $12,000
amount added to income $0
deduction from income allowed $0
Effect on income of services: $0
Taxable Income $60,000
Tax Due $11,344
Amount to Taxpayer $48,656
As it should be, the net effect is the same as with Taxpayer 3
above, who charged for services and then gave $12,000 in cash to the
charities. If the lawyer was allowed to take a deduction of the
$12,000 without being required to take the services she performed for
the charity into income, she would effectively be getting a double
deduction: the $12,000 value of the services would, in the first
instance, be excluded; then a deduction of $12,000 would offset a
portion of non-charitable income, reducing her taxable income to
$48,000 (although her actual income would not change); yielding a
tax due of $8,344; and leaving her with an after-tax income of
$51,656, which is $3,000 more than that left to Taxpayer 3.
Donations of organs are analogous to such donation of services.
As long as there is no commercial market for organs and no sale,
there is no corresponding income tax on the transfer of the organ itself
because it is not an economic event: no income is realized by the
taxpayer. Thus, the effect of a deduction for the inconvenience,
generosity, or lost wages associated with the transfer of a body part
would be the same as allowing the $12,000 deduction to the lawyer
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described above for the contribution of her legal services to a charity.
The deduction would offset amounts never taken into income or taxed
in the first place, placing the taxpayer in a better economic position
than afforded charitable donors currently under the tax code.
Despite this mismatch, we could of course simply decide that we
want the federal government to provide such an economic benefit for
organ transfers as we have with the contribution of long-term capital
gain property, where we allow a deduction for appreciation never
taken into income. Two primary arguments made in favor of using
the tax system in this way focus on the effect of tax incentives on low
income taxpayers in a progressive tax system, and a reduced
appearance of commodification through use of such incentives.
B. Coercion and the Effect of a Progressive Tax System
Many critics of financial incentives for organ transfers express
concerns that were such payments legal, underprivileged individuals
would feel coerced into selling their organs when, in fact, they might
have moral objections to organ transfers or might just prefer not to
sell their body tissue, even upon death. 10 5 Unlike more powerful
individuals, they might feel as though they do not have a choice in the
matter if the alternative is not providing adequately for their family's
needs. 10 6 These scholars admit that the problem is reduced, though
not eliminated, if only cadaveric sales are allowed.10 7
As discussed above, in a progressive tax system like that in the
United States today, deductions and nonrefundable credits are worth
more to middle income taxpayers than to low income ones. Even a
refundable credit is only valuable to those individuals otherwise filing
tax returns and, thus, able to claim it. As a result, any compensation
provided to low income taxpayers in exchange for their organs in the
form of a tax incentive may be minimal or nonexistent.
For some, this differential benefit is one of the strengths of tax
incentives, as it would minimize any coercion of low income
taxpayers inherent in harvesting organs in comparison to direct
105. See, e.g., John Zen Jackson, When It Comes To Transplant Organs, Demand Far
Exceeds Supply: The American Medical Association Renews the Debate On Financial
Incentives To Obtain Organs For Transplant, 170 N.J. L.J. 910 (2002).
106. See, e.g., id.
107. See, e.g., id.
[45:67
HeinOnline  -- 45 Willamette L. Rev. 84 2008-2009
TAX INCENTIVES AND ORGAN TRANSFERS
payments. 10 8 The logic here is that if we allow only middle or high
income taxpayers to benefit from the incentive, we cannot be accused
of economic coercion of underprivileged taxpayers, since such
wealthier taxpayers are not as subject to pressure as a minimum wage
worker or a family living near the poverty line. Besides, proponents
of this logic argue that this disparity in value is consistent with the tax
incentives we currently have for items such as charitable donations'09
and home mortgage interest.1 ° In such a legal world, they ask, why
should it be an issue that this incentive benefits only those who are
better off?
The difficulty with these arguments is that they reflect
unjustifiable paternalism. While there are contexts in which
paternalism may be justified,' this is not one of them because it
involves adults who are fully competent to enter into contracts.
Indeed, financial decisions as to cadaveric donations are significantly
less risky and harmful than countless other decisions the law permits
competent adults to make each day-for example, to drink alcohol,
scuba dive, or work in a coal mine or on construction projects. Put
another way, if we are going to commercialize human bodies by
providing financial incentives for harvesting organs, those incentives
should be available to all who qualify based on relevant factors (like
health) and not based on an individual's tax bracket. Our bodies are
uniquely ours, and preventing low income persons from profiting
because we do not believe they can make as free and as informed of a
choice as middle or high income persons is paternalistic and
demeaning.
Structuring a payment so that it does not apply to low income
taxpayers also undermines the goal of vertical equity. Instead of
effecting a redistribution of wealth in favor of low income individuals
108. See Parker & Winslade, supra note 69, at 91-92 (explaining proposed tax credit
system); Jackson, supra note 105 (stating that "other ideas to avoid exploiting the poor include
offering donors reduced estate tax or other tax incentives, which would benefit only wealthy
donors."); Sally Satel, Op-Ed, Death's Waiting List, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006, at A21 ("We
could even make a donation option that favors the well-off by rewarding donors with a tax
credit."); Chandis, supra note 37 (arguing that coercion concerns could be eliminated by
allowing only the wealthy, and thus presumably socially powerful, the opportunity to take
advantage of the credit).
109. See I.R.C. § 170 (2007).
110. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2007).
111. For example, mandatory seat belt and motorcycle helmet use, statutory rape and
anti-drug laws might be justified on paternalistic grounds.
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as required under the vertical equity principle, such an incentive
works to provide subsidies to higher income taxpayers by providing
them greater tax reductions in exchange for their contributions.
While this effect may track the effect of other tax incentives currently
offered, to include a provision for the express purpose of distributing
wealth upwards is directly contrary to the principles currently in place
with respect to our tax system and makes less sense in the realm of
organ transfers than in the transfer of financial wealth. While
viability of organs for transfer is not a product of income or a taxable
event, the accumulation of wealth is. Providing greater incentives for
wealthier individuals to contribute cash or purchased property to
charitable organizations, since they have more disposable wealth to
transfer in the first instance, makes more financial sense than
providing them greater incentives for the transfer of viable organs.
C. Commodiflcation and Opacity
In addition to voicing concerns about coercion, scholars have
argued that allowing transfers of human body parts and products in
exchange for money will devalue the human body and, ultimately,
human life. 112  They urge that once we assign a dollar value to a
112. See, e.g., Delmonico et al., supra note 42, 2004 ("The fundamental truths of our
society, of life and liberty, are values that should not have a monetary price. These values are
degraded when a poor person feels compelled to risk death for the sole purpose of obtaining
monetary payment for a body part."); Jackson, supra note 105 ("Those who oppose the market
system argue that it is unethical and immoral to profit from the sale of human organs, claiming
that the existence of a market in human body parts cheapens life."); Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass'n, Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement: Ethical
Aspects of Future Contracts for Cadaveric Donors, 155 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 581,
581 (1995) ("Financial incentives to donate ... dehumanize society by viewing human beings
and their parts as mere commodities."); ARTHUR L. CAPLAN, AM I MY BROTHER'S KEEPER?:
THE ETHICAL FRONTIERS OF BIOMEDICINE 96 (1997) ("[A]ny form of compensation for
cadaver organs and tissues is immoral."); Arthur L. Caplan et al., Financial Compensation for
Cadaver Organ Donation: Good Idea or Anathema?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS 219, 220 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho, eds., 1998) ("The message
conveyed is that it is permissible, even desirable, to treat the body as an object of sale and
profit ... when the dead are treated as things, the dignity and moral standing of the living, and
thus, their autonomy, are imperiled."). Compare MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS AND OTHER
THINGS 125-126 (1996) (positing that, in the case of sales of human organs, both
commodification and non-commodification may fail to respect personhood).
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human body part, we become incapable of conceptualizing the body
independent from this value.113
Tax incentives are not seen as less problematic in this regard
than direct payments for body parts because the net practical effect
differs; after all, the net effect of both direct payments and tax
incentives is to financially encourage organ donations. Tax incentives
simply seem less commercial and for this reason are more acceptable.
In comparing tax expenditures to direct payments, Professors
David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim explain that, at times,
[E]ndowment effects [may] make expenditures through the tax
system less visible than direct expenditures. People may perceive a
reduction in taxes for engaging in a specified activity differently
from an identical direct grant: They may perceive a tax subsidy as
merely letting them keep their money, even while they perceive an
identical program that taxes them and gives the money back
through programs or services to be a subsidy.'
14
Professors Weisbach and Nussim focus on the potential good
publicity around enacting a government spending program, and
conclude that the difference in visibility "may actually lead to a
legislative preference for direct spending over tax programs rather
than the other way around."'1 15  They note that in some cases,
however, this "lack of visibility may be a good, rather than a bad,
thing."' 1 6 If a program is desirable but individuals tend to resist it,
"putting it into the tax system could reduce opposition by making it
invisible due to framing effects."
' 17
It is this relative invisibility of tax expenditures that makes the
approach so attractive to some legislators and scholars when
compared to direct payments for organs. To the extent the
expenditure can be framed in terms of a reimbursement or can be
analogized to the existing deduction for charitable contributions, it
avoids the labels of "commodification" and "market," even though
113. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 43, at 208 (summarizing the anti-commodification
argument, while rejecting it).
114. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 970 (2004). See also Parker & Winslade, supra note 69.
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the net effect of the incentive is the same to the taxpayer.' 18 Thus, use
of the tax system to provide the incentive could prove more effective
at obtaining the organs needed for transplant by allowing donors to
feel like what they are doing is donating, not selling. This might be
desirable where the end result (provision of additional organs) is seen
as a societal good, but the means (through compensation) is contested.
Regardless of perception, however, tax benefits are the financial
equivalent of a direct transfer. Where the subject of the tax incentives
is one as controversial as organ purchases, obscuring the decision
being made proves to be bad decision-making and runs counter to the
tax principle of transparency. 119
D. Raising More Questions
If we do believe that it is appropriate and desirable for the
government to permit financial incentives of some sort in exchange
for organ transfers, we are left with a question of institutional design.
Even where there is no independent reason that a tax incentive might
be preferable to a direct payment, it might be that the tax code is still
the most efficient way to implement the program. Professors
Weisbach and Nussim persuasively argue more generally that there is
no inherent reason tax expenditures are better or worse than direct
subsidies. They posit that the question of whether to implement a
"nontax" program through the tax system is not one of tax policy.
Instead, it is a matter of institutional design-how projects related to
the expenditure are assigned and which grouping of activities will
yield the best possible performance. 120  Thus, whether the item in
question is properly included in the tax base is not the question to be
asking; rather, it is enough to ask whether the tax system is the most
efficient institution to provide the payment. 121 This line of reasoning,
then, can be extended beyond government subsidies to ask whether
the most efficient institution is the tax system, a market in which the
government is a primary actor, or a private market.
118. See, e.g., Feifer, supra note 34 ("[C]overing funeral costs can seem like a financial
incentive [to donate], while tax breaks are generally considered an effort to remove a barrier to
donation.").
119. See STEUERLE, supra note 50 ("Transparency is often the bane of special interests
or those who want to hide their special status. Even those who advocate on behalf of particular
principles at times prefer to be opaque.").
120. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 114, at 957.
121. Id.
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Even using this test, however, providing a benefit for organ
transfers through the tax system proves inefficient. While such
benefits should be equally available to all individuals, 22 the only
individuals able to claim the benefit of deductions and most credits
are those with sufficient positive tax liability to be offset. Even
refundable tax credits are only available to individuals filing tax
returns in the first instance.
While it would be an option to have any individual file a tax
return in order to claim a refundable credit for organ donation, this
would greatly increase the costs of implementing the program through
the tax system. The number of returns being filed would be
increased, the IRS's jurisdiction would be extended to an area in
which it has little or no expertise (organ transfers), and donors who do
not already file tax returns would be required to begin to do so. For a
first time filer, the start-up costs of filing can be high, and include
understanding complex tax provisions and, often, hiring outside
experts. Further, such costs would not then be recaptured through
savings of time and effort in later years123 since, for most taxpayers,
the credit would be a one-time event. These issues cause a conflict
between administering a federal benefit program concerning organ
donation through the tax system and the tax principle of
administrability.
As we move ahead in exploring the legal, ethical and practical
options with respect to organ transfers, there are more questions that
remain unanswered. Three I believe are particularly salient concern
liability, the very framing of the problem, and the best allocation of
scarce resources.
First, the increased availability of organs for transplant raises the
specter of increased liability. With a greater supply of transplantable
organs, will we feel a correspondingly increased entitlement to
receive transplants?
Second, the organ transplant problem is generally framed in
terms of an undersupply of transplantable organs. What if, instead,
we frame it as an oversupply of damaged bodies? Does this lead us to
122. And setting aside issues of coercion and paternalism that are discussed supra in
Part W.B.
123. The social welfare programs underlying the EITC and the child care credit prove
administrable, in part, because the start-up filing costs for any individual can be "amortized"
over multiple years since, for most taxpayers, they are not a one-time event. See Batchelder et
al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives, supra note 52, at 71.
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different solutions-for example, shifting the focus from repairing to
preventing the damage in the first instance?
Finally, despite the fact that most scholars put aside the
allocation portion of the organ transplant equation, healthcare is a
zero sum game as insurance funds, hospital space, and surgical time
are limited. Is increasing transplants the best allocation of these
scarce resources?
V. CONCLUSION
Upon initial consideration, providing tax incentives for organ
donations might seem to reflect a sound legislative and ideological
approach, consistent with the current tax code. In addition, such an
approach avoids economic coercion of individuals who, absent
financial incentives, would prefer not to transfer their organs but who
may feel that they have no option once financial incentives are
possible by taking advantage of the progressive nature of our tax
system. Moreover, by routing payments through our tax system and
casting transfers as donations, concerns about commodification of our
bodies are allayed.
On closer analysis it becomes evident that such incentives
conflict with the goals of maintaining vertical equity, transparency,
and administrability/simplicity within our tax system. Such
incentives would convert what is otherwise currently a non-tax event
into a tax item, increasing complexity without providing an
unequivocal reason for doing so. In addition, use of the tax system to
provide financial incentives for organ transfers provides differential
returns to taxpayers based upon a completely unrelated event: their
tax bracket. Finally, use of tax incentives instead of direct payments
obscures the underlying financial reality of the proposals, preventing
meaningful reflection on implications for our understanding of
ourselves. While we could simply decide to use the tax system this
way, any such decision should be carefully considered.
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